Authors: John H. Anderson, Jr.

Date of Publication:  1991

Sponsoring Agency:  Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation Committee on Government Operations

Performing Organization:  U.S. General Accounting Office

Report No: GAO/T-RCED-91-87

Abstract:

We appreciate the opportunity to testify as the Subcommittee begins its oversight into the tragic California train derailment that spilled about 20,000 gallons of metam sodium (weedkiller and pesticide) into the Sacramento River.  While the ultimate damage will become clearer over time, this spill could pose a threat to the region's major water supply and may result in long-term destruction of valuable scenic and recreational resources.

On July 17, 1991, your Subcommittee asked us to review several issues concerning federal regulation of hazardous materials transportation and the circumstances surrounding this particular accident.  Much work needs to be completed before your various questions can be answered.  However, we can discuss the information we have obtained thus far about the accident.  I would like to caution that the information we are providing today regarding the July 14, 1991 accident is preliminary and is based on interviews with various officials including those of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

In summary, regarding the accident we found:
 

• The actual cause(s) of the accident will not be known for some time.  However, there is a question about whether the train may have been underpowered for the region's terrain.  The derailed train weighed 4,292 tons and did not have a separated "pusher" locomotive.  Since the accident, Southern Pacific (SP) has changed its operating practice to limit train tonnage to 3,200 tons.
• Metam sodium that spilled and caused the damage was not classified by either EPA or RSPA as hazardous.  However, the U.S. Coast Guard, which regulates transportation of hazardous materials on water, classifies metam sodium as a hazardous material when shipped in liquid bulk form.  Coast Guard officials told us the substance is in the worst class of marine pollutants because it is highly toxic to marine life.  RSPA's Acting Administrator told us that RSPA relies exclusively on EPA to identify those hazardous substances which should be regulated as hazardous materials when transported in commerce.  Regardless of EPA's designation, we believe that the Secretary of Transportation has independent authority under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974 (HAZMAT Act) to designate metam sodium as a hazardous material.
• We do not know when the first response teams arrived on the scene and whether the response time would have been quicker if metam sodium had been classified as hazardous.  Conceivably, officials might have responded faster if the material had been labeled hazardous.  Also, we do not know whether less damage would have occurred if response time had been quicker because it is unknown how long it took the metam sodium to spill from the car.

We have also found that a number of provisions of the 1990 Hazardous Materials Uniform Safety Act have not yet been implemented.
 
 

No. of Pages:  17