

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

REPORT FOR (month/year)

January 1995

FP-95-03-02

DATE

February 2, 1995

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.

Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Admin.  
Suite 440, North Tower  
1720 Peachtree Rd., NW  
Atlanta, GA. 30309

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)

Norfolk Southern Corporation

Division - Kentucky

REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title)

General Manager - S&E  
Communications & Signal Dept.

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

- A—Automatic
- AB—Automatic block
- ACS—Automatic cab signal
- APB—Absolute permissive block
- ATC—Automatic train control
- ATS—Automatic train stop
- CL—Color light
- CPL—Color position light
- E—Electric
- EM—Electromechanical
- EP—Electropneumatic
- FP—False proceed
- MB—Manual block
- M—Mechanical
- P—Pneumatic
- PL—Position light
- SA—Semiautomatic
- TC—Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC	01/24/95	5158	foreign current	Corinth (Blanchet), KY
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL <input type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

Train No. 388, Engineer \_\_\_\_\_, Conductor \_\_\_\_\_, was stopped on Track #2 at Blanchet waiting on Train No. 108 to clear the block ahead. Meanwhile, Train No. 108 was running northbound, Track #2, on an approach indication waiting for two southbounds to clear the single track ahead. The dispatcher had requested the northward signal for No. 388 at Blanchet so that it would come in once No. 108 could get a signal and clear the block. The crew on No. 388 reported observing that the signal at Blanchet displayed an approach indication for about six (6) seconds then went back to a stop. At this point in time the crew knew that No. 108 was still in the block ahead and reported the false proceed signal they had observed.

Signal personnel investigated and determined that the cause was foreign current causing the coded track relay at Blanchet to chatter on the negative side, thus momentarily picking up the "H" relay for Track #2 while it was occupied. This occurrence was duplicated by observing signal equipment response whenever a northbound train passed a repeater cut section about two miles north of Blanchet. As the rear axle passed through the insulated joint stagger at the cut section, the track relay at Banchet would chatter and very briefly pick the "H" relay. There was approximately 6.5 VAC foreign current present in the stagger at the cut section.

The problem was corrected by installing track reactors (in both tracks) at the Banchet L-case in series with the respective track relays. Appropriate tests and inspections were performed to verify signal system integrity, and the signals were returned to service.