

**FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT**

REPORT FOR (month/year)  
9/7/97

All Railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.  
Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad and region or division)

CSX  
Transportation  
Train Control

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Admin.  
61 Forsythe St SW  
Suite 16T20  
Atlanta, Ga. 30303

REPORTING CARRIER (signature/title)

GENERAL MANAGER SIGNAL MAINTENANCE

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part, E.g.: assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block System.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

A-Automatic	EM-Electromechanical
AB-Automatic block	EP-Electropneumatic
ACS-Automatic cab signal	FP-False proceed
APB-Absolute permissive block	MB-Manual block
ATC-Automatic train control	M-Mechanical
ATS-Automatic train stop	P-Pneumatic
CL-Color light	PL-Position light
CPL-Color position light	SA-Semiautomatic
E-Electric	TC-Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC	9/7/97	U141-05	None	Sessoms Sessoms, GA
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

On September 7, at approximately 0950 hours, train U141-05 was traveling southbound over the switch at the north end of Sessoms. The dispatcher, desiring to line a follow-up movement, called for a reverse switch at the north end of Sessoms. The switch began to move to the reverse position while U141-05 was still over the switch, causing the derailment of four cars.

Upon investigation, signal personnel found the TPSR relay hanging by its wires off the front of the shelf in a horizontal position. In this position, the front contacts were on the verge of being closed. The position of the relay and the vibration due to the passing train caused the contacts to close intermittently and the OS track circuit to indicate clear under the train. The OS track circuit falsely indicated clear, thereby allowing the switch to reverse while the train was still over the switch.

See PP 2

The relay had been installed as part of a timing circuit in late June. The relay was not in a cradle or placed on matting. The relay was repositioned and secured. The location was tested in accordance with all FRA and CSX guidelines with no exceptions taken. The location was returned to service upon completion of repairs.

---