DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

DATE: May 8, 1998

MAIL TO

Mr. Tom McFarlin
Signal & Train Control Specialist
Federal Railroad Administration
1100 Main Street, Suite 1130
Kansas City, MO 64105

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway

Powder River Division
Orin Subdivision

REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title)

Assistant Vice President Signal

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.: assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failure should be included in Item 1. Block System

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report

A	-Automatic	EM	Electromechanical
AB	-Automatic block	EP	-Electropneumatic
ACS	-Automatic cab signal	FP	-False proceed
APB	-Absolute permissive block	MP	-Manual block
ATC	-Automatic train control	M	-Mechanical
ATS	-Automatic train stop	P	-Pneumatic
CL	-Color light	PL	-Position light
CPL-	Color position light	SA	-Semiautomatic
E	-Electric	TC	-Traffic Control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE OR TRAIN NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (City and State)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS [ ] AB [ ] APB [x] TC	5-4-98	CNW8820	none	Logan, Wy.
2 INTERLOCKING [ ] [ ] [ ] AUTOMATIC				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS [ ] ATS [ ] ATC [ ] ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

At approximately 2115MDT Signal maintainer was notified of a switch out of correspondence and a track indication on main track 2 at crossovers 72.5. On inspection maintainer found 3B moveable point frog and 3A switch had been trailed through and sustained bent throw, lock and point detector rods on both switch layouts. Dispatcher was notified to stop train movements and Signal Supervisor and Signal Manager were notified. Vital Harmon Logic controller logs were obtained and it was determined that at 21:05:23 MDT the C&NW 8820 coal train CANN0478 with 107 loads and 0 empties 14980 tons, Conductor and Engineer had received a red over yellow diverging approach on the 1E signal over crossover main track 1 to main track 2 and had trailed through the 3B moveable point frog and 3A switch in the reverse position. Train crew was unaware they had trailed through the reversed frog and switch. Crossover at 72.5 had been reconfigured same day, with preliminary changes made to have the new crossover from main track 1 to main track 2 used in hand throw only, and the existing crossover from main track 1 to main track 2 was removed from service to allow reconfiguration for addition of third main track and final cutover on May 6th. In an effort to expedite traffic during the track changes, Signal Supervisor used existing control and indication circuits from the retired crossover to control and indicate the new main 1 to main 2 crossover using the existing VHLC software program. External Indication locking tests were performed on all switches and moveable point frogs and all showed correct normal and reverse correspondence with the VHLC. Supervisor assumed that since no VHLC software had been changed that it was not necessary to check switch indications against clear signals over affected routes. As a result of moving control and indication circuits from the retired crossover east of 3 crossover to the new crossover west of 3 crossover neither the 1EBHGR or the 2WBHGR checked the 3 crossover switch correspondence. A 1EB signal was requested over main track 1 to main track 2 crossover and the 3 crossover reverse and the eastbound CNW 8820 proceeded on a approach diverging splitting the 3B moveable point frog and the 3A switch.
CORRECTIVE ACTION : 3B moveable point frog and 3A throw, lock, and point detector rods repaired, adjusted and tested switches for indication correspondence and returned to service at 0300 MDT May 5th. Main track 1 to main track 2 crossover removed from service until May 6th, when new VHLC program was installed and signal cutover performed.
Investigation scheduled with Signal Supervisor.