

**FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT**

All Railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.  
Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

REPORT FOR (month/year)  
**10/4/2002**

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad and region or division)

**CSX  
Transportation  
Train Control**

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Admin.  
61 Forsyth St SW  
Suite 16T20  
Atlanta, Ga. 30303

REPORTING CARRIER (signature/title)

Director Signal Reliability

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part, E.g.: assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block System.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| A-Automatic                   | EM-Electromechanical |
| AB-Automatic block            | EP-Electropneumatic  |
| ACS-Automatic cab signal      | FP-False proceed     |
| APB-Absolute permissive block | MB-Manual block      |
| ATC-Automatic train control   | M-Mechanical         |
| ATS-Automatic train stop      | P-Pneumatic          |
| CL-Color light                | PL-Position light    |
| CPL-Color position light      | SA-Semiautomatic     |
| E-Electric                    | TC-Traffic control   |

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input type="checkbox"/> TC				
2 INTERLOCKING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL	10/4/2002	NS-B46	Wiring	Warsaw Crossing at Gr Warsaw, IN
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHE (specify)				

**NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN**

At approximately 03:15 on October 4, 2002 the southbound train NS-B46 traveled across the Warsaw Interlocker (Railroad Crossing at Grade) in Warsaw, In. The NS-B46 proceeded south into the siding at CP 33 (Claypool). The southbound train NS-175 followed the NS-B46 across the Warsaw Interlocker. The crew of the southbound NS-175 reported that they had received a Clear indication at the Warsaw Interlocker and a Stop indication at Signal 30 with the NS-B46 ahead. The Warsaw Interlocker was removed from service and Norfolk Southern signal personnel were dispatched. Norfolk Southern signal personnel contacted CSX signal personnel at 07:45. The Norfolk Southern signal personnel was able to re-create the False Proceed signal through standard field testing procedures. During the investigation it was discovered that a Code Following Relay with Frequency Decoding Contacts (STPAR) had the negative control wire for the relay device (SBDR) that supplies battery to the 4S signal on the number 4 (four) contact when it should have been on the number 1 (one) contact. The number 4 (four) contact is a non-tuned contact that follows the working action of the relay. The number 1 (one) contact is a tuned contact that follows the working action of the relay only when the action reaches a minimum of 115 code cycles through a maximum of 125 code cycles. The use of the number 4 (four) contact supplied battery to the SBDR. Further investigation revealed that the circuit plans for the location show that the wire was designed to be on the

number 1 (one) contact on the STPAR and the condition was corrected. The appropriate tests were made and the Warsaw Interlocker was returned to service.