

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

REPORT FOR (month/year)

1/2/2004

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad and region or division)

**CSX
Transportation
Train Control**

REPORTING CARRIER (signature/title)

Chief Engineer Signal Maintenance

All Railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.
Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Admin.
61 Forsyth St SW
Suite 16T20
Atlanta, Ga. 30303

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part, E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block System.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

A-Automatic	EM-Electromechanical
AB-Automatic block	EP-Electropneumatic
ACS-Automatic cab signal	FP-False proceed
APB-Absolute permissive block	MB-Manual block
ATC-Automatic train control	M-Mechanical
ATS-Automatic train stop	P-Pneumatic
CL-Color light	PL-Position light
CPL-Color position light	SA-Semiautomatic
E-Electric	TC-Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC	1/2/2004	071502	Relay	North End of Indiantown, Fl
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

At 1430 hours on January 2, 2004, Train crew report on O71502 while operating southbound on signal main track into signal siding over reverse switch, observed and reported a medium approach (Red over Yellow) into the siding with a set of cars setting in siding. The signals were removed from service at 1645 hours and a team was dispatched to the site to investigate this event. Investigation revealed that the RBCTPR relay, a Track Coding Relay had bridged contacts allowing the Code Following Relay (RBTR) to be energized. Further investigation revealed that the RBCTPR relay contacts were allowed to become bridge from the constant shunting of the track from the train cars left in the signaled siding for a long period of time. The constant coding at a high current value caused the contacts to become pitted and bridged. The cars were stored in the siding three weeks prior to the incident.

The RBCTPR relay was replaced and a circuit design to open the negative coil path through the RBCTPR relay coding contact. Signals were restored to service at 1400 hours on 1/9/04.