

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

REPORT FOR (month/year)
JULY, 1995

ALLEGED FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

DATE
11-Jul-95

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within fifteen days after a false proceed signal occurs.

REPORTING CARRIER

Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company
2721 161st Street
Hammond, IN 46323-1099

Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO

Department of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration
Office of Safety, RA-613
Washington, D.C. 20590

REPORTING OFFICER (signature and title)

Engineer - Communications and Signals

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

- A-Automatic
- AB-Automatic Block
- ACS-Automatic Cab Signal
- APB-Absolute Permissive Block
- ATC-Automatic Train Control
- ATS-Automatic Train Stop
- CL-Color Light
- CPL-Color Position Light
- E-Electric
- EM-Electromechanical
- EP-Electropneumatic
- FP-False Proceed
- MB-Manual Block
- M-Mechanical
- P-Pneumatic
- PL-Position Light
- SA-Semiautomatic
- TC-Traffic control

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input type="checkbox"/> TC				
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> AUTOMATIC <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MANUAL	6-Jul-95	IHB 9206 9209	SIGNAL 15-16	DOLTON, IL.
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

At approx. 0615 am, Thursday, July 6, 1995, IHB Train BA-2, Engine 9206 was proceeding Eastbound from the IHB Blue Island Yard, Riverdale, IL, on Track 2 when the train passed Absolute Signal 15-16 in the stop position at Dolton Interlocking, Dolton, IL. Absolute Signal 15-16 is a three unit searchlight signal with GRS Type SA Mechanisms. The IHB Engineer stated that he had observed Signal 15-16 after passing the ICG over head bridge and that Signal 15-16 was displaying a RED/RED/YELLOW aspect for a RESTRICTING indication and was proceeding through the Interlocking at Restricted Speed when he was asked where he was going by the Dolton Tower Operator and told to stop his train. The IHB Conductor was on the trailing unit, IHB 9209 and unable to see the aspect displayed by Signal 15-16. The IHB Helper was on the lead unit, IHB 9206, and said the Signal 15-16 displayed a RED/RED/YELLOW Aspect for a Restricting Indication. The Dolton Tower Operator stated that he never lined the signal lever to clear Signal 15-16 for train BA-2's move. Signal 15-16 will display a RED/RED/YELLOW aspect for a Restricting Indication only for a Following move in the eastbound direction. The lamp voltages were found to be: Signal 15A - 9.6v; Signal 15B - 9.6v; and Signal 16 - 10.2v. No exceptions taken. The signal lenses, hot spots and cover glasses were found to be intact, clean and properly aligned. All cable meggered clear. No crosses or grounds were detected. All relays and signal mechanisms were within operating specifications. All traffic locking was functioning as intended. No exceptions taken to any items inspected and/or tested. Signal was observed the next morning at the same time of day under nearly identical weather conditions with no visibility interference from the rising sun detected.

Train crew was scheduled for investigation on Friday, July 14, 1995, but waived investigation and accepted discipline of thirty day suspension.