

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

OMB No.
2130-01

REPORT FOR (month/year)

December, 2000

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

DATE

January 2, 2001

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)

Candian Pacific Railway
C&M Sub

Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO

Mr. T. F. Maske
Signal & Train Control Specialist
Federal Railroad Administration
111 North Canal Street, Suite 655
Chicago, IL 60606

REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title)

Mgr Signal & Communications

Eng File RS2071
cc: JCT
JDS

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report

A—Automatic	EM—Electromech
AB—Automatic block	EP—Electropneum
ACS—Automatic cab signal	FP—False proceed
APB—Absolute permissive block	MB—Manual block
ATC—Automatic train control	M—Mechanical
ATS—Automatic train stop	P—Pneumatic
CL—Color light	PL—Position light
CPL—Color position light	SA—Semiautomatic
E—Electric	TC—Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TC	12/18/00	CP8507	X-OVER SWITCH	SOUTH MILWAUKEE, WI
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL <input type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC				
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

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(If more space is required, continue on reverse)

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

NATURE OF FAILURE:

On Dec 18, 2000 at approx 1300 CP8507, with Engineer Skotarzak and Conductor Franklin, proceeding east on #2 Main track approaching Control Point at Lake had a clear signal to proceed east on #2 main track with the east end of the west crossover (#5) lined reverse.

Just previous, a Westbound Amtrak train had crossed over from #2 main track to #1 Main track at the west crossover (#5) at Lake.

After Amtrak had passed control point at Lake, Dispatcher requested west crossover (#5) to be lined normal and requested an eastbound absolute signal on #2 Main track at Lake to be cleared. The switch on the West end of west crossover (#5) went normal and the switch at east end of west crossover (#5) did not move, staying reverse. The west crossover (#5) indicated both ends were lined normal and the eastbound absolute signal cleared.

Signal Maintainer K.D. Huebner noticed the malfunction and stopped train CP 8507 before running through the switch.

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Further investigation revealed a jumper wire in the GRS 5F switch machine on the east end of crossover had been applied across terminals 1 and 8 which would allow the crossover to indicate normal or reverse dependent upon position of the crossover switch on the west end of crossover. It is unknown why the east end of the crossover (#5) did not move to normal as requested but frost in contacts or armature is suspected.

Corrective action taken was removal of the jumper from contacts 1 and 8 and crossover tested by removing power from each end simultaneously requesting opposite end of crossover to go normal or reverse and verifying if either end is not in correspondence and it will not indicate. Immediately all crossovers on the CP Railway (Soo Line) utilizing GRS Model 5F switch machines were inspected and found to be correct. CP Railway (Soo Line) is presently drafting a test procedure to be done every 2 years in conjunction with RS&I Rule 236.380 Indication Locking Test utilizing the above testing procedure.