

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

OMB No. 04-R-0028

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

REPORT FOR (month/year)

February 2001

DATE

March 12, 2001

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)

Montana Rail Link  
P O BOX 16390  
Missoula, MT 59808

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.  
Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO

Federal Railroad Administration  
650 Murdock Bldg  
703 Broadway  
Vancouver WA 98660

REPORTING OFFICER (signature/title)

Director  
Signals & Communications

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

- A-Automatic
- AB-Automatic block
- ACS-Automatic cab signal
- APB-Absolute permissive block
- ATC-Automatic train control
- ATS-Automatic train stop
- CL-Color light
- CPL-Color position light
- E-Electric
- EM-Electromechanical
- EP-Electropneumatic
- FP-False proceed
- MB-Manual block
- M-Mechanical
- P-Pneumatic
- PL-Position light
- SA-Semiautomatic
- TC-Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
<b>1 BLOCK SYSTEMS</b> <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input type="checkbox"/> XTC	2/27/01	MRL 406	WP Circuit	Livingston, MT
<b>2 INTERLOCKING</b> <input type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL				
<b>3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS</b> <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
<b>4 OTHER (specify)</b>				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

See attached.

FP01-9-1  
3/13/01

(If more space is required, continue on reverse)

False Proceed Report  
Montana Rail Link  
February 27, 2001

On February 27, 2001, Signal Maintainer Mike Hardesty observed the 841 local crossing over from the East Leg of the Y at Livingston to the Yard when he observed the WP relay at Livingston Hump in the energized position. The WP relay should have been deenergized at this time since two of the 3 hand operated switches in this WP circuit were in the reverse position.

Signal Department Personnel immediately corrected the problem by making the appropriate circuit changes. Tests were performed to verify the signal system functioned as intended.

Investigation by Signal Department personnel revealed that this problem occurred when Signal Crew 101961 cut over a new underground cable for the West Leg of Y switch and thereby removed the WP circuit from the Yard Switch and East Leg of Y switch. The Signal Foreman took full responsibility for this error and stated the error occurred because he did not know that all 3 switches were on the same WP circuit. The Signal Foreman was relieved of all Foreman responsibilities pending a Fact-Finding hearing.

On March 9, 2001, a Fact Finding hearing was held to determine the facts involving this incident. In the Fact Finding hearing the Signal Foreman accepted full responsibility for this incident. The Foreman stated in the hearing that he thought this was a simple circuit change and did not see a need to consult with his Supervisor prior to performing the work. Although this was not intentional interference, this incident happened because the Signal Foreman interfered with vital circuits and did not make the appropriate tests to ensure the integrity of the Signal System. Upon review of the official transcript, disciplinary action will be taken as deemed necessary.