

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

REPORT FOR (month/year) May 02

DATE May 29, 2002

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within fifteen days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division) National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

MAIL TO

Mr. David Myers  
Regional Administrator  
Federal Railroad Administration  
International Plaza Two - Suite 550  
Philadelphia, PA 19103

REPORTING OFFICER (signature) *5/29/02*

Senior Director C & S  
Maintenance / Compliance  
Third Floor North Tower Box 41  
30<sup>th</sup> & Market Street  
Philadelphia Pa. 19104

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3 and 4; the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal to indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indications of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

- |                                 |                        |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| RA - Automatic                  | EM - Electromechanical |
| AB - Automatic Block            | EP - Electropneumatic  |
| ACS - Automatic Cab Signal      | FP - False Proceed     |
| APB - Absolute Permissive Block | MB - Manual Block      |
| ATC - Automatic Train Control   | M - Mechanical         |
| ATS - Automatic Train Stop      | P - Pneumatic          |
| CL - Color Light                | PL - Position Light    |
| CPL - Color Position Light      | SA - Semiautomatic     |
| E - Electric                    | TC - Traffic Control   |

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city and state)
1. BLOCK SYSTEMS G AB G APB G TC				
2. INTERLOCKING G AUTOMATIC G REMOTE G MANUAL	May 17, 2002 G		Switch Detector Locking	Chicago Ill.
3. AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS G ATS G ATC G ACS				
4. OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE/CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

On May 17, 2002 at approximately 8:30 AM-CT Metra Commuter train 2116 operating in a shoving move with 2 locomotives and 9 cars derailed the lead locomotive at the switch {37-MPF} entering track number nine. There were No injuries to passengers or crew. Investigation determined that the {37-MPF} switch had been thrown normal while the last locomotive was traversing over the switch. Investigation revealed that a 39-foot section of rail located between the N37 switch and the R40 signal had been removed to facilitate the replacement of long switch ties on track two. This rail removal caused the 37-track circuit to be down and the 37 & 39 switches to be detector locked. Engineer C&S revealed that jumpers had been applied bridging contacts in the 37 & 39 switch lock circuit, which disabled the switch locking circuits on the 37, & 39 switches. This condition allowed the train director to throw the 37-switch under the Metra train. This accident caused considerable damage to the Interlocking infrastructure {track & Signal} and on board equipment which was estimated at \$30, 000 cost. Track and signal restoration was completed by 2-PM on Sunday May 19, 2002. Record of jumper permission was found in office per AMT-23, section number eight that indicated that authorized the jumper to be applied. {Copies attached} This accident was caused by an employee failing to follow proper procedures in the application of Jumpers, per Amtrak AMT-23 Rules number 300 thru 304 & 407. Rule number 302 reads: The guiding principle at all times must be that any protection temporarily defeated by the jumper must be provided by some other means until the removal of all jumpers is assured and original protection is restored. Rule number 407 which reads in part ...When necessary to disconnect or impair the function of locks, circuits, or other safeguards in an interlocking, all switches affected must be safely secured before any train or engine is permitted to pass over them... failed to ensure that protective measures were in place. The Division Engineer has indicated to this writer that the events that caused this incident are not normal procedure. He has initiated new procedures for the application of jumpers that require his or the Manager C & S authority. He has also scheduled instructional meetings with C & S employees to re-enforce jumper procedures, as well as checking C & S employee AMT-23 & 27 qualifications. He has also accessed discipline against {who has accepted full responsibility for this accident}, and is requiring to meet with all C & S employees to discuss his involvement in this accident. The C & S system office will be issuing an advisory on the use of Jumpers and attaching a paper copy of the Electronic Jumper Permission Log currently in use on the Northeast Corridor for distribution to other areas of the Amtrak system.