

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

FALSE PROCEED SIGNAL REPORT

REPORT FOR (month/year)
May-03

DATE 5/23/2003

REPORTING CARRIER (railroad & region or division)

Canadian National Railway GTW

REPORTING OFFICER (signature & title)

Supervisor of Signals

All railroads subject to Regulations of the Federal Railroad Administration shall submit a false proceed signal report, original only, to the Federal Railroad Administration within five days after a false proceed occurs. If no false proceed occurs during any calendar month, a report showing "No Failures" must be filed within ten days after the end of the month.

Copies of this form will be furnished upon request to the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety, Washington, D.C. 20590

MAIL TO:

Regional Administrator
Attention: S&TC Specialist
Federal Railroad Administration
200 W. Adams St. Rm. 310
Chicago, Illinois 60606

A failure should not be counted more than one time in items 1, 2, 3, and 4: the failure should be classified under the basic system or appliance of which it forms an essential part. E.g.; assume grounds cause a block signal in indicate a false proceed causing corresponding indication of a cab signal system on each train approaching this point, such failures should be included in item 1, Block Systems. A false proceed failure is a failure of a system, device or appliance to indicate or function as intended which results in less restriction than intended.

The following abbreviations may be used in the report.

A=Automatic	EM=Electromechanical
AB=Automatic block	EP=Electropneumatic
ACS=Automatic cab signal	FP=False proceed
APB=Automatic permissive block	MB=Manual block
ATC=Automatic train stop	M=Mechanical
CL=Color light	P=Pneumatic
CPL=Color position light	PL=Position light
E=Electric	TC=Traffic control

TYPE OF SYSTEM	DATE	LOCOMOTIVE NUMBER	DEVICE THAT FAILED	LOCATION (city & state)
1 BLOCK SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> AB <input type="checkbox"/> APB <input type="checkbox"/> TC				
2 INTERLOCKING <input type="checkbox"/> AUTO-MATIC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REMOTE <input type="checkbox"/> MANUAL	5/21/02	M393 3120	Plant Trap	Wellsboro, IN
3 AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS <input type="checkbox"/> ATS <input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> ACS				
4 OTHER (specify)				

NATURE AND CAUSE OF FAILURE, CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

Event : Dispatcher on Desk TD4 from operations center reported westbound train M39331 20 accepted a signal 4L at the Wellsboro interlocker on the South Bend subdivision, although his panel had shown a occupancy on track 2 on the CSX. This occurred on Wednesday May 21, at 12:41 EDT. Plant was taken out of service to be investigated by the Signal department.

Investigation : CSX was performing undercutter maintenance on their track, and created a track circuit wire to be severed, therefore creating a track occupancy on the TD4 panel. From the Digicon logs, signal 4L had been previously clear prior to the CSX severing the track wire. This track occupancy put signal 4L at stop, until the CSX had repaired the track wire. Then the signal cleared even with the panel still reflecting an occupancy.

The occupancy shown on the panel was created by the CSX trap circuit . (Trap circuits are used for the 66 feet dead section of track where the CSX crosses the CN trackage). In a normal train move the trap circuit get released after the train passes through the entire interlocker. With the occupancy created by the undercutter only on the north side of the interlocker the trap did not release.

The investigation has revealed that planned additions were requested by CSX to this location in 1998. In the investigation we found that CN missed installing a portion of the modifications, also there was a software logic error introduced with the CSX electronic interlocker. Either of the railroads performing these changes correctly would have prevented this false proceed to occur. The CN has retrofitted the logic changes to it's portion of the interlocker to correct the situation. The CSX will be correcting their software, to have the a second method of preventing this condition from occurring.

It should be noted this interlocker worked properly for all normal through movements, the fault was found only on the trap circuit.

FORM FRA F 6180-14 (6-72) (Modified CNIC 6/00)
FRA Reports.3/False Proceed Report.2